

Analysis of the Crimean Tatars Situation During the Occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 with the Conflict and Peace Studies Approach

Sezai OZCELİK¹

Abstract

In 2014, the Russian Federation unexpectedly produced a crisis in Crimea. Without a single shot, Putin's Russia illegally has occupied and annexed Crimea. This paper analyzes the historical background of the crisis with the emphasis on the Crimean Tatars. First, the history of Crimea briefly is presented. Second, the Crimean Tatars national struggle is explained by using peace studies and nonviolence concepts and theories. Third, the 2014 Crimean Crisis were explained by using not only geo-strategic and geo-economic concepts but also psycho-historical concepts, specifically chosen traumas of the Crimean Tatars and Russians. The article suggests that Russia invaded Crimea not only the strategic national interests of the Black Sea Fleet but most importantly the losing of Crimea in 1954 and 1990s as chosen traumatic events. Similarly, the Crimean Tatars were produced their national identities on their "Sürgün", the forceful deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin to Siberia and the Central Asia.

Keywords: Crimea, Crimean Tatars, Russia, Ukraine, Putin

¹ Associate Prof. Dr. Sezai ÖZÇELİK, Cankırı Karatekin University, International Relations

Introduction

After the closing ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics, there was an unexpected incident happened in Ukraine. There was a Russian-made crisis in the peninsula of Crimea. Some scholars believe that the Crimea Crisis can be anticipated since Russia's 20th and 21st century foreign policy. But timing of the Crisis is surprising for all international relations scholars. In spite of the Sochi Winter Olympics, nobody has foreseen the "New Cold War" and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Some analysts assume that the annexation of Crimea is geo-strategically and geopolitically first step for Russia to expand its territory former Soviet Union era. Crimea is the first expansion; the next will be the Eastern Ukraine, the Caucasus and the even Central Asia. Another scholars believe that Russia aims to increase its political and economic influences in the former Soviet Empires, namely the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. "Backyard policy" is called by the Russians as "Near Abroad" policy in which Russia's geopolitical, geoeconomical, and geostrategic interests and priorities first "innermost circle of Russia" namely the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Also, Russia perceives any foreign interventions of the CIS regions as the violation of the non-interference of domestic affairs rule. When the West have decided to include the former Soviet Union republics, the Baltic states, into the NATO alliance and the European Union, the Russian policy-makers thought that the West directly threaten the Russia's national interests. NATO can be categorized as hard power and the EU is an actor to use its normative and soft power. The EuroMaidan movement was the beginning of the Crimean Crisis that the Ukrainian people came together in the Kiev against to the supporter of Russia: Yanukoviç. With the domino effect, the EuroMaidan movement led to the another citizen revolution in the Southeastern part of Europe, but it has also led to the Russian annexation of Crimea in February-March 2014.

In the first part, the situation of Crimea and the Crimean Tatars is analyzed within the framework of conflict analysis and resolution and peace studies fields. In this section, the nonviolent nature of the Crimean Tatar national movement is examined. Specifically, the nation-building of the Crimean Tatars is analyzed by using the chosen trauma concepts. The last section summarizes the rising effects of Russia in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region and the ripple effects of the 2014 Crimea annexation.

Crimean Tatars National Movement and Nonviolence

Throughout history of the Crimea, many different ethnic groups and nomads have lived in the peninsula. The ethnic origin of the Crimean Tatars can be traced to the Kipchak Turks. In addition, the Crimean Tatars ethnicity has been influenced by the migration movements from Asia to Europe.² There were three Crimean Tatars sub-ethnic groups. The Nogai Tatars come from the Kipchak Turks with Asian faces living in the middle of Crimea. The Tat Tatars are believed to descended from the Gots in the mountain area of Crimea with Scandinavian features. The Yaliboyu Tatars or Coastal Tatars are mixture of Greek and Armenians in the Crimean shores.³

There are two important factors why the Crimean Tatars protect their national identities. First and foremost, the incident of "Sürgün" or mass deportation that become a chosen trauma for the

² Brian Glyn Williams. *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation*, Leiden: E.J. Brill Academic Pub, 2001.

³Greta Lynn Uehling, *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan Pub., 2004, p. 32.

Crimean Tatars to preserve their ethnic national identity. Second, the Crimean Tatar language has a vital role to glue the Crimean Tatar community together. Belitzer presented in Table 1 that almost all Crimean Tatars indicate their mother tongue as the Crimean Tatar language.⁴

Tablo 1- Ukraine Census Results of Mother Tongue and Crimean Tatars (2001)

Ethnic Identity	General Number	Mother Tongue				
		<i>Russian</i>	<i>Ukrainian</i>	<i>Crimean Tatar</i>	<i>Ka-raït</i>	<i>Krym-chak</i>
Crimean Tatars	248.193	15.208	184	228.373	0	0
Karaites	1.196	931	160	23	72	0
Krym-chaks	406	263	41	68?	0	68

Crimean Tatars are an ethnic group who live in Crimea since first millennium. On 18th May 1944, Soviet Union leader Stalin forced ethnic Crimean Tatars to migrate from their homeland to Siberia and the Central Asia. The main cover for this incident was the alleged collaboration of the Crimean Tatars with the German Army, Luftwaffe. However, many Crimean Tatars have fought in the Red Army to free the Soviet Union from the German invasion. The forced migration known as Sürgün by the Crimean Tatars played a pivotal role in the creation of their ethnic identity and national struggle. The Crimean Tatars started a grassroots nonviolent struggle against the Soviet Union in 1956 after the post-Stalin era. In 1954, Crimea was given as a gift to Ukraine by Khrushchev in order to show the lasting friendship between Ukrainians and Russians. The year of 1954 was 300th year anniversary of Pereyaslav Treaty on January 08. The Pereyaslav Treaty was signed by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky who was Ruthenian/Ukrainian and Cossack-Orthodox for the oath of allegiance to Russia/Moskovy. In 1954, this treaty was commemorated with big celebrations and speeches that indicating “eternal Ukrainian and Russian Slavic friendship and union” of the Communist Party. As “a symbol friendship of Russian people”, Crimea was given as a gift to Ukraine.⁵

The Crimean Tatars (CT) nonviolent struggle has been supported by the Soviet dissidents such as Andrey Sakharov and Grigorenko. The CT nonviolence during the Soviet time has been personalized with Mr. Mustafa Jemilev. Mr. Jemilev has used hunger strike and other civil disobedience tactics to achieve only purpose: The return of the Crimean Tatars their homeland, the Crimean Peninsula. He has suffered extensively for his nonviolent struggle. He has been arrested and jailed 6 times. He has also been in hunger strike for 303 days in the late 1960s to raise international awareness to the Crimean Tatars cause. Because of the success of the widespread nonviolent resistance of the Crimean Tatars inside the Soviet Union and the outside diaspora support, they have been finally returning to their homeland in 1989. Since 1989, they have continued their cause via nonviolent struggle and civil disobedience. The Crimean Tatars have mostly used a ‘Sharpian’ nonviolent approach to achieve their political objectives and national identity formation. They believe that “bad peace is always better than good war.” Since they are a

⁴Nataliya Belitzer, “Endangered Languages in Crimea/Ukraine: The Cases of Crimean Tatar, Karait, and Krymchak”, *Endangered Languages and Linguistic Rights Foundation for Endangered Languages Conference*, Barcelona (Catalonia), Spain, 1-3 October 2004, s. 176.

⁵Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division; 4 edition 2009, s. section 24: Reconstruction and Retrenchment.

small nation, the only way to achieve their political objective is the principle of nonviolence. Also, the nonviolence is embedded in the Crimean Tatar popular culture. Next, the historical and close ties to the Soviet dissident movements make the nonviolent resistance obvious choice for the Crimean Tatars. In the last part of the paper, we compare the Crimean Tatar nonviolence strategy to Chechens' national movement, who also faced forced migration during WW2 but has following the violent means to reach its political ends.

In recent decades, the Crimean Tatars in Crimea, Ukraine and Chechens in Russia have developed unique methods of political expression that are seemingly opposed to each other since their return of historical homeland. While one is inclined to assert its identity needs against Russian oppression and authoritarian rule through peaceful protest, the Chechens demonstrates a more direct violence approach. Each of these groups has endured harsh deportation and assimilation policies and prejudicial treatment under the Soviet Communist government, and they have been struggling to maintain their cultural identities since the 1950s. Although the Chechens have been involved in violent uprisings in the past, the Crimean Tatars have favoured the nonviolent protests, What is the political reality involved here? Why are the Crimean Tatars more predisposed to nonviolence? What are the major contributing factors that explain the nonviolence approaches of Crimean Tatars? By definition, nonviolent and civil resistant protests and violent demonstrations are differentiated by the pre-mediated intentions involved concerning the well-being of innocent civilians and political opponents. On the one hand, nonviolent and civil resistant protests attempt to voice political grievances and gain public support with methods that are intended to bring no harm to other people. In this regard, the Crimean Tatar practices of nonviolence have used involved only one person act such as the Mustafa Jemilev's long hunger strikes during the Soviet time. This kind of self – sacrifice acts may still be considered nonviolent protest—the only person at risk is the one performing the act. In addition, Crimean Tatars have attempted mass nonviolent and civil resistant protest that aims to address grievances and gain public support through direct actions that are meant to bring no physical harm to other people. The example of this was the Crimean Tatars demonstration at the Red Square in 1989 during the Soviet Union time.

There are very few studies that attempt to explain nonviolent political behaviours at the Muslim societies such as the Crimean Tatars. Most of studies do are not also concerned with causal factors that inspire a group of people to choose nonviolent and civil resistant techniques. Most of the time, the scholars have explained the use of violence as a necessary evil to attain those things which peaceful protest has failed to accomplish. While this explanation offers a valid understanding of the subject, it fails to address the fundamental issues that inspire nonviolent and civil resistant resistance movements as collective social models for group behaviours. A better understanding of the structural and cultural factors involved in these cases may shed light on specific indicators that inspire nonviolent protests against an authoritarian state. This study argues that factors like psychological chosen traumas, national cohesion, inter-religious disputes between ethnic groups, and international support may provide the needed insight to understand why a minority group such as the Crimean Tatars may choose nonviolence instead of violence. First, it hopes to outline the Crimean Tatars forced deportation (*sürgün*) as social group identity maker have inspired the Crimean Tatar national movement. Then, it highlights how and why the Crimean Tatars national movement have evolved toward nonviolence and civil resistant during the Soviet time. The personality of the Crimean Tatars leader, Mustafa Jemilev, has been important force and factor in nonviolent resistance. He has been used nonviolence as a main political tool for the Crimean Tatars to gain their rights especially rights to return their homeland, Crimea, Ukraine. Finally, it assesses

important variations in cultural and structural factors that have had an impact on Crimean Tatars and Chechens resistance movements.

The Basic Human Needs (BHNs) Theory⁶ usually explains the deep-rooted and protracted conflicts. BHNs Theory is based on the Maslow's human need pyramid. John Burton adapted the Maslow's need pyramid into conflict analysis and resolution field. BHNs assumes that if humans basic needs are not satisfied, it leads to violent conflict. Moreover, unsatisfied human needs not only causes direct violence but also structural and cultural violence. In the international relations, there are three important basic human needs – identity, security, and recognition. These three needs can not be bargained, suppressed and avoided. Only solution of conflict is satisfaction of three basic human needs. The BHNs theory is universal. All three needs belong to all human beings but the satisfaction of these needs may be different from culture to culture. The satisfier of these needs can change for every society and culture. If a basic human need is satisfied in accordance with the cultural setting, conflict and violence can decrease and even be eliminated.

According to the basic human needs theory, the cause of violence and conflict, first and foremost, is identity need. Any social group in terms of ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. attempt to shape and to preserve the group identity. Social groups may face violence and pain in order to create, maintain, and preserve their identities. Even a member of social group may give his/her life for this purpose. In short, if identity and security needs are not met to be satisfied, violence and conflict result in.

It has been argued that ethnic conflicts in multi-national states are generally a reflection of intense issues regarding social, economic, identity and security. The conflict resolution field emphasizes the satisfaction of basic human needs. If two basic human needs – identity and security – are not satisfied for the conflicting ethnic groups, the deep-rooted and protracted violent conflicts are inevitable in international relations. The identity needs of the Crimean Tatars are rooted in the forced deportation of them on 18th May 1944 by Stalin. The incident known as *sürgün* is labelled as chosen trauma⁷. Chosen traumas for ethnic groups are another important source of the ethnic group identity creation and maintain. The fundamental source of the Crimean Tatar resistance, therefore, is the policy of assimilation by the Soviet Communist Party, which requires conformity to authoritarian government that denies the existence of any distinct cultural identities. This is accompanied by issues of prejudice, economic inequality, and persecution through unlawful imprisonment, torture, and constant surveillance of daily activities during the forced deportation (*sürgün*) years under the Soviet rule. The Soviet and Russian governments have had an intense interest in the Crimea region since 1700s. The Crimean Peninsula still is very important for geopolitically and geostrategically not only for Russia but also for all countries in the Black Sea region.

Until the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Crimean Tatar resistance has followed a similar cyclical pattern, which involved periods of peaceful protest, forceful repression, extreme government regulation, and eased tensions. The Crimean Tatars' discontent toward Soviet and later Russian policies has manifested itself through a wide range of mechanism that demonstrates restraint in the use of violence to react to harsh assimilation policies. Also, protests have been strikingly using political nonviolence, meaning the Sharpian nonviolence. The leader of the

⁶Yılmaz, Reha ve Sezai Özçelik. 2012. *Çatışma Teorileri Işığında Gürcistan ve Karabağ Çatışmalarının Çözümlemesi, Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri*, Atilla Sandıklı, ed., BİLGESAM Yayınları: İstanbul, ss. 280-282.

⁷Vamik D. Volkan, *Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy: A Sourcebook on Large-Group Psychology*, Karnac Books, 2014, s. 24.

Crimean Tatar, Mustafa Jemilev, has adopted the Western ideals of democracy and human rights in his rhetoric, thus opposing the central ideology of the Communist party.

National Identity and Chosen Trauma

The Crimean Tatar national identity is closely linked to the incident of forced deportation (sürgün) occurred during the World War II. Because the Crimean Tatars have a national unity that emerged from the collective punishment of the Soviet authorities, they have become more prone to nonviolence. The strength of the unified Crimean Tatar community has inspired a spirit of restraint and nonviolence.

The Crimean Tatars are a Turkic ethnic group, whose culture, language, and religion make them entirely dissimilar to the native Russian population in Crimea, Ukraine or Russia. Because their unique group character, this group of people has been able to formulate a distinct cohesive identity to counter the suppressive policies of the Soviet regimes. Every Tatar firmly believes that Crimea is the historical homeland of their ancestors. The Crimean Tatar national narrative was also adopted by the other Soviet dissidents, namely Andrey Sakharov and Grigorenko. Because the story was unique to the Crimean Tatar ethnicity, it has had much power to motivate a more unified, and possibly nonviolent and peaceful front against the Soviet Communist party.

All Crimean Tatars felt—and still feel—a strong sense of belonging to this distinct national community because they all bonded a common chosen trauma. The Crimean Tatars are all suffered from the forced deportation. The political nature of this identity has been significantly strengthened over the course of Soviet Communist rule. The Soviet authorities have attempted to diminish the effect of Crimean Tatar identity by continuing to demonize and dehumanize the Crimean Tatars in Central Asia. The counter pressure of the Soviet authorities resulted in the assertion of the Crimean Tatar nationhood through acts of protest against the central government and its various mechanisms of social control with nonviolent tools and strategies. It is safe to say that The Crimean Tatar national narrative is a product of Crimean Tatar hands, making it a more profound driver of national unity.

Structural and International Influences

The Crimean Tatar national resistance movement has been influenced by structural and international factors that have contributed to the development of nonviolent strategies. The strength of the Crimean Tatar national governmental body (Kurultay), its support in the Crimean Tatars diasporas in Turkey, the United States and Europe, and the positive image of its resistance have contributed to a situation of legitimacy and confidence that make peaceful protest a more appealing method of political expression. The vast support networks and strong centralized organization of the Crimean Tatar national governmental body have promoted sentiments of hope and legitimacy among the population in Crimean Tatars. This has made peaceful protest a more desirable method of resistance, especially as a demonstration of innocence to the international community. This highly developed and democratic structure of the Crimean Tatar political institutions have strengthened the power and influence of the Crimean Tatar government, allowing it to have a significant voice in the international community. Unlike the Chechen resistance movement in Russia, there do not seem to be any significant extremist groups among Crimean Tatars that aim to cause harm to other people.

Last Words

The Crimean Tatars in Turkey are a diaspora. Diaspora describes an immigrant social group. A diaspora group may live outside to its homeland, motherland and/or fatherland and maintain its distinct ethnic identity. The diaspora continues its relationship with the homeland and kinship. The Jews are the best known and the oldest diaspora group in the world. One of the important characteristics of the diasporais the traumatic event that is a decisive factor for the diaspora group's ethnic identity. The Crimean Tatars who returned to Crimea in 1990s can be described as the diaspora. Moreover, there are the Crimean Tatars diasporas in Turkey, USA, Romania, Bulgaria, and European countries. The diaspora nationalism has been used in international relations field. The Turkish Crimean Tatars have not had an active diaspora nationalism for a long time.⁸ Some scholars has given 5 million Crimean origin migrants in Turkey. But most of the Crimean Tatars have been assimilated and they have very passive diaspora nationalism in Turkey.⁹

In order to understand the Crimean Tatars situation during the 2014 Crimean Crisis, it is necessary to examine the Crimean Tatars diaspora in Turkey as well as the Turkish foreign policy. When the Crimean Crisis happened, Turkey was in local election period. The Crimean Tatars diaspora in Turkey has been done internet campaigns, conferences, TV programmes, newspaper articles, and news in order to produce a public opinion about Crimea in Turkey. The Crimean Crisis may also have created a micro-nationalism among the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. However, they have not had enough effects on both Russia and Turkey. The Turkish Crimean Tatars diaspora have played an important role in the post-September 11th world to improve Turkey-Ukraine and Turkey-Russia relations. The Turkish foreign policy has been based on traditional realist approach during the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). In addition, AK Party has introduced more "constructivist approach" in the Turkish foreign policy by emphasizing "New Ottomanism" and "Islamic identity." Interestingly, Turkey-Russia relations could be shaped within "economic strategic partnership." In the 2014 Crimea Crisis, Turkey has not followed any diaspora nationalist demands of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey has had a pragmatist policy to reach 2023 Goals and to become a regional power.

The condition of a resistance movement to adopt either violent or nonviolent methods is a related to the effects of national cohesion, confidence, and legitimacy. Because of united national identity and culture of Crimean Tatars that promotes the strength and durability of a resistance movement, it makes less likely to splinter into factional groups and less desperate to attempt to use violence. Moreover, the existence of a strong, centralized Crimean Tatar government, along with the support of influential and resourceful diaspora communities around the world legitimizes the methodology of nonviolent and peaceful protests and enhances the confidence of the minority group that political reform is an achievable objective. The incident of the forced migration (sürgün) has played an intricate role in defining the strategic use of nonviolence as means of political expression.

The recent developments in Crimea, in my opinion, will make little changes in the Crimean Tatars overall strategy of the nonviolent resistance. The nonviolence is and has been the main independence strategy for the Crimean Tatars since the Soviet Union times. For the most Crimean Tatars, especially for young generation, violence may seem a viable option. Many international relations specialists have analyzed the Crimean Crisis in terms of geopolitics, geostrategy, and geo-economy. However, the Crimean Crisis has psycho-historical and psycho-analytical roots both for Russians and the Crimean Tatars. Both of them have chosen traumas dating back 1989 and

⁸ Chong Jin Oh, "Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Ethnic Korean Minority in Kazakhstan and its Lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 34, No. 2, May 2006, s. 112. (ss. 111 – 129).

⁹ Williams, 2001, p. 227.

1944. Russians have never dealt with their lost of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Crimean Tatars have been deported from their homeland (Yeşil Ada) and experienced ethnic cleansing. The Crimean Crisis has made surface the past wounds. Also, both of them have claimed that Russians and the Crimean Tatars are both victims. The egoism of victimization, a Freudian concept, is used by not only for the Crimean Tatars but also Russians.

Nonviolence resistance may seem useless against Russia for the Crimean Tatars since Russia is very powerful and undemocratic state. The best good examples of nonviolence resistance are the Mahatma Gandhi's India against the Britain, the Nelson Mandela's movement against the South Africa apartheid regime, the Martin Luther King's civil right movement against the United States, etc. There are other examples especially in the Muslim world such as the Palestinian intifada against Israel, the Pashtun leader Ghaffar Khan against the British occupation, the Kosovo Albanians against Serbia, etc. The Crimean Tatars nonviolence resistance is another good and relatively successful example during the former Soviet Union period and behind. The annexation of Crimea without any major violence made the Crimean Tatars felt hopeless and desperate. But there is still great hope to re-energize the Crimean Tatars movement. Although there are some religious groups who may have link to outside powers and incline to provoking violence in Crimea, the core of the Crimean Tatars national movement still follow nonviolence. Nonviolence was and still is only viable option for future of the Crimean Tatars people.

Most international relations specialists have analyzed the 2014 Crimea Crisis within geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economical factors. But both Crimean Tatars and Russians have psycho-analytical and psycho-historical attachment to Crimea. The Crimean Tatars perceive the 1944 Sürgün as a chosen trauma. Similarly, Russians have never reconciled the lost of the Soviet Union in 1989 that can be categorized as chosen trauma, too. The past historical traumas have surfaced again in the Crimean Crisis. Both the Crimean Tatars and Russians should deal with their group psychology in constructive and win-win solution way. But it is not possible for a short term. In the long term, there should be more regional peace policy with multi-level analysis and multi-track diplomacy. All conflict sides should avoid only realist and geo-strategic point of view.

For the Crimean Tatars, it is useless to employ the power politic tactics against powerful and anti-democratic Russian escalatory moves. The Crimean Tatars should continue their nonviolent strategy that is similar to Mahatma Gandhi who fights against the Great Britain, Nelson Mandela's success against the South African apartheid regime and Martin Luther King in the USA. In the Islamic world, there are some successful nonviolent movements such as the Palestinian Intifada against Israel, Afghan Pashtun leader Ghaffur Khan against Britain, and Kosova Albanian of İbrahim Rugova against the Serbian aggression. The Crimean Tatars may have felt hopeless about nonviolent strategy. Despite the Russian violent tactics in Crimea, the Crimean Tatars national movement should continue the path of nonviolence. The nonviolence is still only viable option for the Crimean Tatars.

Bibliography

Brian Glyn Williams. *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill Academic Pub, 2001).

Chong Jin Oh. "Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Ethnic Korean Minority in Kazakhstan and its Lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 34, No. 2, May 2006, ss. 111 – 129.

Nataliya Belitser Belitser. "Endangered Languages in Crimea/Ukraine: The Cases of Crimean Tatar", *Karait, and Krymchak, Endangered Languages and Linguistic Rights Foundation for Endangered Languages Conference*, Barcelona (Catalonia), Spain, 1-3 October 2004, ss. 174 – 181.

Reha Yılmaz and Sezai Özçelik. 2012. Çatışma Teorileri Işığında Gürcistan ve Karabağ Çatışmalarının Çözümlemesi, *Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri*, Atilla Sandıklı, ed., BİLGESAM Yayınları: İstanbul, ss. 277-313.

Subtelny Orest. *Ukraine: A History*, University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division; 4 edition 2009, s. section 24: Reconstruction and Retrenchment.

Vamik D. Volkan, *Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy: A Sourcebook on Large-Group Psychology*, Karnac Books, 2014.